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The proposed revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure
being prepared by the Louisiana Law Institute conforms with
the Barnes principle that the defendant's right to a bill of par-
ticulars must be fully safeguarded. It gives the defendant a
right to request a bill of particulars "before trial or within ten
days after arraignment, whichever is earlier," and further pro-
vides that "after the expiration of the ten day period the
court may permit the filing of such motion until the com-
mencement of trial. '25 By giving the defendant the right to
request a bill of particulars for a specified and reasonable time
after the arraignment, the Supreme Court will have more as-
surance that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying a delayed motion on the grounds that it was dilatory
in nature; but the rule of the Barnes case should still require
the trial judge to assign his reason for denying a motion after
the ten-day period.
David L. French
DONATIONS - CAPACITY OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO
ACCEPT DONATIONS MORTIS CAUSA UNDER LOUISIANA LAW
Decedent, a Louisiana domiciliary with no forced heirs, be-
queathed all his property to the National Institutes of Health,
Public Health Service, for research into the cure and prevention
of chronic spastic constipation. Decedent's nephew alleged he
was the sole heir and brought suit to invalidate the testamentary
disposition and to obtain an order to distribute the property in
accordance with the law of intestate succession.' The district
court held the will valid, and plaintiff appealed. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal reversed. Held, the United States gov-
ernment, its agencies and subdivisions are not considered "per-
sons" within the meaning of Louisiana Civil Code article 1470,2
and are therefore incapable of receiving a donation mortis causa
25. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, ExpoSlt DES MOTIFS no. 12, Indictment
and Information tit. XII, art. 24 (March 16, 1962).
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1096 (1870) : "A succession is called intestate when
the deceased has left no will or when his will has been revoked or annulled as
irregular.
"Therefore the heirs to whom a succession has fallen by the effects of law
only, are called heirs ab intestato."
2. Id. art. 1470: "All persons may dispose or receive by donation inter vivos
or mortis causa, except such as the law expressly declares incapable."
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under Louisiana law. In re Shepard's Succession, 156 So. 2d 287
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 158 So. 2d 612 (La.
1963).
The inherent power of the United States government to
receive testamentary gifts is well established.3 It is equally
well settled that under the tenth amendment the states have
retained the power to determine the manner in which and to
whom testamentary dispositions may be made by its citizens.4
Language in United States v. Burnison, however, indicates
that under the supremacy clause 6 a state may not inter-
fere with the federal government's inherent power to receive,
but may only limit its domiciliary's power to give to the fed-
eral government.7 The question whether Louisiana citizens may
donate mortis causa to the federal government was res nova
in the instant case. Civil Code article 1470 provides "all per-
sons may dispose or receive by donation inter vivos or mortis
causa, except such as the law expressly declares incapable.""
Subsequent code articles enumerate certain absolute and relative
incapacities, 9 none of which preclude donations to the federal
government. 10 Nor is there any other statutory provision which
expressly denies testators the power to make dispositions to the
United States government. As recognized in the instant case
3. United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87 (1950) ; United States v. Perkins,
163 U.S. 625 (1896) ; United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876) ; Mager v.
Grima, 49 U.S. 490 (1850).
4. See note 3 supra.
5. 339 U.S. 87 (1950).
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI: "2. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding."
7. United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 91 (1950), in which the govern-
ment contended that capacity to receive was a governmental power, the exercise
of which the state was prohibited to restrict. To this the Court replied: "This
argument fails to recognize that the state acts upon the power of its domiciliary
to give and not on the United States' power to receive. As a legal concept a
transfer of property may be looked upon as a single transaction or it may be
separated into a series of steps. The approach chosen may determine legal con-
sequences. Where powers flow so distinctly from different sources as to the power
to will and the power to receive, we think the validity of each step is to be
treated separately."
8. See note 2 supra.
9. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1471 (1870): "The incapacities are absolute or rela-
tive :
"Absolute incapacities prevent the giving or receiving indefinitely with regard
to all persons.
"Relative incapacities prevent the giving to certain persons, or receiving from
them."
10. Id. arts. 1476-1479, 1481, 1483, 1484, 1784.
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the central inquiry is therefore whether article 1470 authorizes
a testamentary disposition to the federal government.
The court in the instant case declared that the federal gov-
ernment did not have the capacity to receive a donation mortis
causa since it was not a "person" within the intendment of
article 1470. Article 1470 was said to grant capacity to receive
only to natural persons. This interpretation was grounded on
three observations: First, Article 433 of the Civil Code specifi-
cally grants corporations capacity to receive by stating that
they are "substituted for persons."" The court reasoned that
this provision would have been unnecessary if "persons" in arti-
cle 1470 had a broad meaning. Second, article 3556(23)12 indi-
cates that "person is applicable to men and women, or either."
Third, the court interpreted article 1470 to contemplate as
''persons" only those who could dispose and receive by both
donation inter vivos and mortis causa.13 To the government's
contention that Louisiana's gift tax statute14 exempting gifts
to the United States evidenced the capacity of the federal gov-
ernment to receive, the court pointed out that the statute ap-
plied only to donations inter vivos, and in any event, there is
no necessary connection between a statute regulating succession
to property and one setting forth tax exemptions. 5
The court denied the federal government the right to take
11. Id. art. 433: "Corporations legally established are substituted for per-
sons, and their union which renders common to all those who compose them,
their interests, their rights and their privileges, is the reason why they are con-
sidered as one single whole. Hence it follows that they may possess an estate,
and have a common treasury for the purpose of depositing their money; that
they are capable of receiving legacies and donations; that they may make valid
contracts, obligate others and obligate themselves toward others; exercise the
rights which belong to them; manage their own affairs; appear in courts of jus-
tice, and even enact statutes and regulations for their own government, provided
such statutes and regulations be not contrary to the laws of the political society
of which they are members."
12. Id. art. 3556: "Whenever the terms of law, employed in this Code have
not been particularly defined therein, they shall be understood as follows: . . .
(23) Person-Person is applicable to men and women, or either."
13. In re Shepard's Succession, 156 So. 2d 287, 291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
14. LA. R.S. 47:1204 (1950) : "The following transfers shall be exempt from,
and excluded in computing, the tax transfers imposed by this chapter:
"(1) Gifts made exclusively to charitable, religious or educational institu-
tions located within the State of Louisiana, provided no part of the net earnings
of such organizations inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or indi-
vidual.
"(2) Gifts made to the United States, the State of Louisiana, or any political
subdivision thereof, or civic organizations, provided that the donor does not bene-
fit directly or indirectly by such donations."
15. It could be argued that Louisiana would not provide a tax exemption for
a gift that could not be validly made.
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under the will in the instant case because it had not been
granted "the capacity to receive a donation mortis causa in
Louisiana."16 The power of a state to deny the federal govern-
ment the capacity to receive is subject to grave constitutional
doubt in light of language in United States v. Burnison.7 Al-
though the court in Burnison held that a state may prohibit
testamentary dispositions by its citizens to the federal govern-
ment, there was a strong implication that the state could not
deny the government the power to receive and that "the ap-
proach chosen may determine the legal consequences." ' It would
be difficult to read article 1470 as denying the capacity of a
person to dispose to the federal government rather than as
failing to grant the federal government the capacity to receive. 9
Hence there is serious doubt whether article 1470 may consti-
tutionally be invoked to deny the government the right to re-
ceive under an otherwise valid will.
In addition to the constitutional question raised by the
application of article 1470, the court's narrow construction of
"persons" seems questionable in view of the prevailing civil
law classification of "persons" into both natural persons and
artificial persons. 20 There appears to be no compelling reason
16. In re Shepard's Succession, 156 So. 2d 287, 291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
17. 339 U.S. 87 (1950). See note 7 supra.
18. 339 U.S. at 91.
19. The statutes under consideration in United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S.
87 (1950) and United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876) are not subject to the
same criticisms as the Louisiana court's interpretation of article 1470, because
they stipulate to whom the donor can give, and do not specify who cannot receive.
CALIF. PROBATE CODE § 27 provides: "Who may take by will. A testamentary
disposition may be made to the state, to counties, to municipal corporations, to
natural persons capable by law of taking the property, to unincorporated religious,
benevolent or fraternal societies or associations or lodges or branches thereof, and
to corporations formed for religious, scientific, literary, or solely educational or
hospital or sanitorium purposes, or primarily for the public preservation of for-
ests and natural scenery, or to maintain public libraries, museums or art galleries,
or for similar public purposes. No other corporation can take under a will, unless
expressly authorized by the statute."
The New York statute under consideration provides that a devise of land may
be made "to any person capable by law of holding real estate; but no devise to a
corporation shall be valid unless such corporation be expressly authorized by its
charter or by statute to take by devise."
20. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 10, 11 (1925). Here the author
states that persons are divided into two categories: natural persons and artificial
persons. Examples of these persons are charitable institutions, and public and
private corporations.
1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY TiE Lou-
ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 3023 (1959). In speaking of the territorial
subdivisions which have domains of their own and those that do not, it is said:
"[T]he first of all these subdivisions in terms of importance, that which today
is the support and basis of all of them, is the State. In all countries, the State
is deemed to be a person, representing the entire nation in its sovereignty and
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why "persons" in that article should not be accorded its usual
treatment as a generic term referring to all legal entities. Arti-
cle 1470 is derived from article 90221 of the French Civil Code
which, rather than restricting the power to dispose and receive
by donation, appears to be a codification of Pothier's theory
of autonomy of the will. 22 The scheme of the article is a broad
general grant of capacity which is thereafter limited by specific
exceptions. 28 A similar Civil Code article states that "all per-
sons have the capacity to contract, except those whose incapac-
ity is specially declared by law."'24 It seems unlikely that by the
use of "persons," the redactors intended not to grant the fed-
eral government the capacity to contract under Louisiana law. 25
Article 493 of the Civil Code is a further indication that "per-
sons" is used generically throughout the Code: "The right of
ownership necessarily supposes a person in whom this right
exists; whether the owner be a real person, such as an indi-
vidual, or a civil or intellectual person, such as a corporation. ' 26
The reasons given by the court for restricting "persons" to
natural persons do not seem convincing. From the context of
article 433, the purpose of the provision that corporations are
"substituted for persons '27 is to constitute corporations legal
entities separate from those who compose them. That corpora-
its independence. The nation thus personified possesses, under this name, a great
deal of property which forms its collective domain."
Contra, United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 321 (1876), in which the court
was dealing with a statute which prevented receipt of donations unless the recip-
ient was a "person" or authorized corporation. The court stated: "[T]he term
'person' as here used applies to natural persons, and also to artificial persons,-
bodies politic, deriving their existence and powers from legislation, -but cannot
be so extended as to include within its meaning the Federal government. It would
require an express definition to that effect to give it a sense thus extended."
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S.
600 (1941) recognized that "there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The pur-
pose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive
interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an in-
tent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law."
Id. at 604-05.
It is submitted that the Louisiana courts should follow the civil law classi-
fication of "persons" - that it does include the state or nation within the mean-
ing of persons.
21. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 902: "Toute personnes peuvent disposer et re-
cevoir, soit par donation entre vifs, soit par testament, ercevt elles que la loi
en ddelare incavables."
22. Cf. 7 POTHIER, OEUVRES COUTUMES DES D'ORLEANS tit. 15, § 1, at 276
(1830) ; POTHIER, OEUVRES SUR LES TESTA.ENS 48-50 (1810).
23. See note 10 supra.
24. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1782 (1870).
25. It is clear that under the supremacy clause a state could not so interfere
with the activities of the federal government. See note 7 supra.
26. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 493 (1870).
27. Id. art. 433. See note 11 supra.
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tions, which are creatures of state law, are specifically granted
the capacity of persons would not seem to foreclose the pos-
sibility that there may be other such entities contemplated
within the generic term "persons." It seems beyond question
that the United States government is a legal entity. The reli-
ance on article 3556 (23)28 as indicative of a restriction of "per-
sons" to natural persons seems tenuous. It does not define per-
sons as men and women, but only provides that it is "applica-
ble" to both.29 No compelling reason appears why article 1470
should be read to contemplate only "persons" who can both
dispose and receive by both donations inter vivos and mortis
causa. That such was not intended is evidenced by the state-
ment in article 433 that as a result of the substitution of cor-
porations for persons "it follows . . . that they are capable of
receiving legacies and donations. . .. ,,30 If the court's interpre-
tation of article 1470 is sound, it would not follow that a cor-
poration was capable of receiving legacies since it cannot both
dispose and receive by both donations mortis causa and inter
vivos. Therefore, it is submitted that the reasons advanced by
the court in the instant case do not compel that the grant of
capacity to receive in article 1470 be limited to natural persons.
It appears that the rationale of the court in the instant case
would also preclude the State of Louisiana from receiving dis-
positions mortis causa made by its citizens. There is no provi-
sion expressly granting the State of Louisiana the capacity to
receive donations. Nor can it be said that the state would
qualify as a natural person under article 1470. 31 It is submitted
28. Id. art. 3556(23). See note 12 supra.
29. This provision was adopted in the Civil Code of 1870.
30. Id. art. 433. See note 11 supra.
31. It is submitted that it cannot be argued that since the state can take by
intestate succession that, by analogy, it can take by testate succession. It is
established that the state does not take as an heir but by a form of escheat.
See Louisiana v. Ames, 23 La. Ann. 69, 71-72 (1871), in which it was con-
tended that the state took as an irregular heir under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 917
(1870) (providing for the right of the state to take where a vacant succession
exists). The court, replying to this contention, stated: "This doctrine we are
unable to assent to. In no proper sense, we apprehend, can the State be styled
an heir, when, in the absence of heirs of every denomination by law capable of
succeeding by inheritance, the property of the deceased owner becomes vested in
the public, and is at the disposal of the government. On this point Demolombe
says: 'the fourth law of the Code of Justinian, De bonis vacantibus, declared,
Bona vacantia mortuorum tune ad fiscum jubemus transferri, si nullem ex quali-
bit sanguinis linea vel juris titulo legitimum relinquerit intestatus haeredum.'
Such, then, is the true cause of acquisition to the profit of the State; the State
is not in reality an heir or successor, in the technical sense of the word, for it
acquires by the title of escheat, that is to say, precisely in virtue of a title which
supposes, necessarily, that there are no heirs; which caused Bacquet to say that,
when a man dies without heirs, the goods left by his death non vocantur bona
1964]
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that this is further evidence of the generic use of "persons"
in article 1470 in that the legislature surely did not intend to
preclude the state from receiving donations. The decision in
the instant case does not endanger the right of many state agen-
cies to receive, since they are treated as corporations, 2 or there
is specific legislation authorizing them to receive.
83
It is submitted that the court's conclusion that the federal
government is without capacity to receive in Louisiana is sub-
ject to grave constitutional doubt in light of language in United
States v. Burnison 4 Further, it is submitted that the court
should not have narrowly construed 35 article 1470, and that
"person" should have been treated in the generic sense to en-
compass all legal entities. Therefore, it is submitted that the
federal government, as well as the State of Louisiana, should
have the capacity to receive donations mortis causa under Lou-
isiana law.
Charles G. Gladney
heriditarea sed vacantia nominantur. In a word, the State exercises in this mat-
ter the eminent right of sovereignty, in virtue of which it appropriates all prop-
erty without a master which is found within its territory."
See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1922 (1959) : "If there are no heirs, the
State acquires the succession as a vacant property, without an owner. (Art.
768) State is not an heir; it does not succeed by an inheritance title, but by
exercise of its sovereignty.
"The succession obtained by the state is called escheat (d~sh6rence). The
right of escheat is exercised by the Administration of Public Property (Admin-
istration des domains; now merged with the system of public finance agencies) ;
under Arts. 769 and 772. Formerly, the State had to'request delivery of posses-
sion, with the same formalities as an irregular successor. This procedure was
simplified by the Act of October 30, 1935."
32. LA. R.S. 22:331 (1950) (non-profit Funeral Services Association); id.
34:203 (Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal District) ; id. 34:243 (New Iberia
Port District) ; id. 34:293 (Lafayette Harbor and Terminal District) ; id. 34:323
(Morgan City Harbor and Terminal District) ; id. 34:333.3 (Abbeville Harbor
and Terminal District); id. 34:334.3 (Vinton Harbor and Terminal District)
id. 48:225 (State Department of Highways).
33. Id. 25:9 (Louisiana State Library); id. 25:343 (Louisiana State Mu-
seum) ; id. 25:304 (Louisiana Art Commission).
34. 339 U.S. 87 (1950).
35. The court appears to have used the exegetical method of Code interpreta-
tion which requires that every solution be based on the enacted legislative texts.
It is submitted that a more liberal interpretation would have been accorded in
the instant case had the court used the method of "free scientific research" as
advanced by GENY, METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF PRIVATE POSI-
TIVE LAW (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION 3Y THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTI-
TuTE (1963). See Loussouarn, The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom,
Doctrine, and Precedent in French Law, 18 LA. L. REV. 235 (1958).
